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Rechtsstaat, l’État de droit, Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, from Germany to France to Russia, 
these are terms that refer to the role of law, its nature and political utility in the 
process of governance. The theoretical interest in the concepts that stand behind the 
terms, such as accountable government, has an intellectually rich tradition. Because 
they originated in Europe and because of the continent’s impact on the world, they 
have been also geographically universalized from Indonesia to Burundi, for example 
(Bossuyt et al. 2013; Qamar, 2013).
Although the interest in law and its role has a long history, it was re-energized and 
re-informed by the demise of feudalism in Europe. Feudal society was the common 
experience of all Europeans. Its main characteristics were collective identity, disre-
gard for individuality and the personalized rule of the feudal landlord. He shaped the 
identity of the household, set the rules upon which it functioned and decided about 
the lives of its members. His wishes provided the foundation for the household’s laws. 
Consequently, the legal could be changed at will. Personalized rule also meant per-
sonalized politics: the landlord exercised power in a direct way, including meting out 
justice. Therefore, he was free to use whatever means of power he wished to utilize.
Moving away from feudalism required institutionalized politics. Thus, the will 
of the ruler needed to be replaced by institutionalized rules of governance. Conse-
quently, this replacement was changing the role of law, for it became a chief factor of 
the institutionalization of politics. This new role of law was further enhanced by the 
growing size of the areas of jurisdiction. The households, be it by force or agreement, 
were combined into a much bigger space, for example, principality, the size of which 
made it impossible to rule over it in a direct and personal way. The prince needed a 
set of rules that had to be obeyed by his subjects and a set of institutions that could 
implement them. This eventually led to the creation of the modern state; and because 
the end of feudalism was gradual and uneven, various types of states emerged. This 
process was also prolonged. 
For example, the Icelandic Althingi was set up in 930. The Russian Duma was estab-
lished in 1906. The Magna Carta in 1215 severely limited the power of the monarch, 
which eventually would be almost entirely transferred to the parliament. In Russia, 
by contrast, the last tsar Nicholas II was still declaring his devotion to autocracy.
1  The Jagiellonian University in Kraków.
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Furthermore, the movement away from feudalism was a multifaceted process. 
One of the most important factors was the asymmetrical shift from collectivism to indi-
vidualism. The asymmetry derived from the interplay of the individualism of political 
freedoms and the collectivism of feudal society. The former eventually were institu-
tionalized in the form of rights that ushered in constitutionalism. The latter morphed 
into nationhood, the modern form of collectivism, which would be built into the state 
in the form of the welfare state dispensing public goods. As a result, the paternalism 
of the feudal household and the individualism of constitutional rule became inter-
connected. The interconnectedness, however, was not necessarily between two equal 
parts. In some states, there was more paternalism than individualism. In some other 
states, it was the other way around.
In Britain, the interconnectedness became strongly tilted towards individualism. 
The Magna Carta was the first step. What followed was a long process of limiting the 
ruler’s powers. The limitations became a list of do’s and don’ts the royal had to obey. 
Over the centuries, the list has become a combination of both written and unwritten 
measures that eventually led to a parliamentary rule and accountable government. 
The monarch became merely a symbol of the state’s authority with the task of protect-
ing its stability in case of a constitutional crisis.
The very fact that some constitutional limitations imposed on the power holder 
are unwritten well illustrates the utility of law in the British tradition of individualism. 
The main aspect of the utility is the very nature of law, for it is not simply to prohibit 
and punish but, instead, to nurture individualism and protect the rights of individu-
als. Therefore, the spirit of law is civic-mindedness and citizenship. As an English 
colonel put it, “… I do think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a 
strict sense to that government that he has not had a voice to put himself under… ” 
(quoted in Heater, 2004, p.63).
Still more, spirit does not necessarily require letters; but it does necessitate its 
proper comprehension, which becomes a form of guidance to civic attitude and 
behavior and, in the end, community of free individuals. Law exists to govern people, 
for they are not to be governed by arbitrary decisions of power holders. As such, the 
role of law became the rule of law. Subsequently, the legal was to protect the freedom 
and the practical was to protect the legal.
With such a strong emphasis on individualism, it is not surprising that pubic 
goods came only after the rule of law had been firmly entrenched in society. The first 
step towards the welfare state was the 1942 Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and 
Allied Services (Beveridge, 1944). By then, all segments of British society had the 
rights acknowledged and protected. In fact, being British meant having rights as an 
individual.
The role of law in continental Europe was not a duplication of the British approach. 
The French case of the interconnectedness was more balanced, for paternalism was 
not de-emphasized. The 1789 Revolution introduced the notion of Le Citoyen. She was 
now to be free, but she was also not to be hungry. The clarion call of the revolution 
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– liberté, égalité and fraternité – reflected the more balanced approach to rights and 
goods. Liberté was about rights. In this sense, the French revolution was similar to 
the British tradition of individualism. However, fraternité was about goods. The link 
between the two was égalité, especially for the third estate. Thus, while stressing the 
rights – the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen – the idea of the deliv-
ery of public goods by power holders was not rejected. This is why the declaration 
included several articles on taxes. This stood in contrast with the Magna Carta, which 
was about reducing taxes or not paying them at all (Vincent, 2012).
The combination of goods and rights was put in the context of nationhood (col-
lectivism) and national citizenship (individualism). Thus, being French meant being 
both free and provided with public goods; and the citizen was entitled to both, for he 
was French. The legal was to maintain Frenchness. The practical was to shelter and 
reinforce the legal. The role of law became the l’État de droit.
In Germany, the interconnectedness was similar to the British tradition, for it was 
equally unbalanced. This was also the chief difference, for in the German context the 
stress was put mainly on collectivism. Similarly to the French experience, the goods 
were put in the context of nationality. When Germany was unified by Bismarck in 
1871, its people were late with their formation of nationhood. Most Europeans had 
already developed their national identity. Being late was making the unification ever 
more difficult to accomplish. The main difficulty was the millennium of conflicts and 
shifting alliances among the German principalities.
Unifying them into one state, the Second Reich, required a means that would 
be acceptable to all members of the First Reich. The common unifying factor were 
public goods, for they had a long history in the German lands, going back to the medi-
eval times (Knox, 1993; Radich n.d.). Now Bismarck had to put them in the context of 
unification.
In 1883, he passed the Workers’ Health Insurance Act, followed by the 1884 
Industrial Accident Insurance Act and the 1889 Invalidity and Old-age Insurance Act. 
These schemes were national and constituted a system of national solidarity. They 
were designed for a collective, the German nationals, rather than for an individual. 
Thus, being German meant being entitled to them because one was a member of the 
German nation. Consequently, the welfare state became a means of nation building; 
and this was a task for the unified German state. To do so, the state had to have a 
tool for fulfilling the task. The social insurance acts required various regulations for 
implementation. Since the new German state passed the acts, it was also its role to 
issue the regulations and to execute them. Fulfilling the task became the primary role 
of law.
Bismarck could not solely use force to unify the Germans. Force is not an effective 
tool for identity formation. Nevertheless, he had to impose uniformity to eliminate the 
centuries-long regional divisions. The matter of creating national identity became a 
social question (James, 2000, p.63). The question was to be dealt with by the state pro-
viding public goods and doing so through law. However, unlike in Britain and France, 
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the law sought to instill collectivism at the expense of individualism and the rights 
that came with it. Hence, the legal was to promote Germaneness through social soli-
darity, which became an important part of the firming up of German nationalism. The 
practical was to serve the legal. The problem was how this should be effected.
Before the unification, the goods were dispersed at the regional level. Although 
state institutions of a principality were delivering them, this was done on behalf of 
the regional ruler. Therefore, the goods and the delivery mechanism were in a way 
an extension of personalized politics and rule carried over from the feudal house-
hold to modern times. Moreover, the regional leaders represented tradition, which 
for many ruling dynasties became a foundation for their legitimacy. By contrast, the 
goods and delivery coming from the newly created state lacked the tradition, author-
ity and respect of the regional leaders. These lacking elements had to be put in place.
In a speech to the Reichstag on May 9, 1884, Bismarck said,
Give the working man the right to work as long as he is healthy; assure him care when he is sick; 
assure him maintenance when he is old. … [I]f the State will show a little more Christian solici-
tude for the working man, then I believe that the gentlemen of the Wyden [Socialist] programme 
will sound their bird-call in vain, and that the thronging to them will cease as soon as working 
men see the Government and legislative bodies are earnestly concerned for their welfare (quoted 
in Krueger, 2000, p.118).
The paternalism of feudalism was recreated with all its characteristics. The Germans 
were to be provided again by the power holder, for the new government was just as 
caring as were the regional rulers. However, since Bismarck’s government did not 
have the patina of tradition, he had to modify the main elements of the tradition and 
move them to the national level.
First, because there was no dynasty that could support political stability, the 
methods of exercising power had to be adjusted accordingly. In the feudal household, 
the landlord could jump on a horse, move around the domain and point with his 
hand which way a new road was to be built. Now, to do the same, the hand had to be 
reinvented.
Second, the pointing needed to be realigned to reflect the changed settings of 
power: for example, the large size of the unified Germany; industrialization and its 
impact on stability, such as the workers’ movement; or the need to deal with matters 
related to development. The realignment was necessary for the new government to be 
efficient. Only then, was there a chance for the new hand to be effective and eventu-
ally legitimate. To accomplish that, Bismarck converted the authority of a German 
prince to the authority of the German state by modernizing the institutions of the 
latter and keeping the traditional character of the former. This was done by employ-
ing state regulation.
For instance, to administer the 1884 insurance act, he set up the Arbeitgeberver-
band in den beruflichen Korporationen, a bureaucracy responsible for a centrally 
managed system of payments for medical treatments and compensation monies to 
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 1/30/19 11:08 AM
 Remarks on the Legal and the Practical...   49
accident victims. By 1886 the insurance covered agricultural workers. Thus, carrying 
over feudal authority in a modernized form, the central government become the sole 
provider of the benefits in a manner of a feudal ruler.
Of course, such a system required rules of operation. To manage the payment 
system, both the government and, upon instruction, the Arbeitgeberverband, could 
and did issue seemingly endless regulations clogged with detail. This was the gov-
ernment’s modern hand that was pointing out the direction of this and any other 
policy. Thus, the Rechtsstaat was put into practice, the kind of state that was feudal 
in spirt and origin, but modern in form and method. Its authority remained essen-
tially unchanged, as it was still imposing its will on the population without public 
consultation; and it continued to be the essential center of decision making. Just like 
in the Middle Ages, the center was able to shape to a significant degree the lives of 
the people who remained subjects, even if modernized. Therefore, instead of jumping 
on a horse to manage the household, the chancellor used regulation to manage the 
Germans. Law became the modern form and method; but the execution of power 
retained its feudal character. The sternness of the landlord’s rule was now reflected in 
the legalism of the Rechtsstaat. Consequently, the nature of regulation also retained 
its feudal features: it was prohibitive, controlling and collectivist.
Without individualism and rights, such as the rule of law or the l’État de droit, the 
Rechtsstaat was a modernizing factor, but it was not a tool of modernity. It became 
such a tool when the Rechtsstaat was supplemented and enhanced by Rechtssta-
atlichkeit – rule of law-ism – which was introduced to the Germans after the Second 
World War. It was also tailored to the country’s Rechtsstaat. It kept it in place; but 
added to it individualism and, hence, rights and, in general, the principles of liberal 
democracy.
From the perspective of a formal understanding, the term Rechtsstaat describes the type of state 
architecture and political order system in which all publicly applied power is created by the law 
and is obliged to its regulations and underlies numerous fragmentations of power and control 
mechanisms (“Bindung und Kontrolle”). Rechtsstaatlichkeit in this sense is a collective term for 
numerous (sub-)principles that allow the taming of politics by the law and shall avoid arbitrari-
ness. From the perspective of a more substantive understanding, Rechtsstaatlichkeit also expres-
ses democratic concerns and the respect to individual human freedom and equality and thus the 
commitment to a liberal and just constitutional order (Koetter, 2013).
This is why now “… many European writers … use the term ‘rule of law’ when they 
write in English about ‘Rechtsstaatlichkeit’.” (Silkenat et al. 2014, p.93).
The critical additions were the mechanisms and principles that were to tame both 
the usage of legalism and the legalism itself, for the former was allowing arbitrari-
ness and the latter was a tool of arbitrariness. The process of adding individualism 
and rights, however, was neither straightforward nor quick. After all, it required an 
outside intervention. After the defeat in 1945, the Germans were required to change 
fundamentally the state, its operations, and their attitudes towards it. In short, they 
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were required not only to modernize themselves, but, first and foremost, become 
modern.
Max Weber, while trying to figure out what makes society change in a profound 
way, for instance, by switching from authoritarianism to democracy, identified several 
factors of societal change, such as, the religious attitudes of the Protestants, the stock 
exchange or, indeed, the role of law. However, he concluded that the factor that con-
tributed the most to the change was the prevailing type of authority. According to 
Weber, there are three ideal types of it: traditional, legal, and charismatic. (Weber, 
1947, pp.324-423) The traditional type is based on deeply rooted principles of govern-
ing. As long as the ruler observes them, he is legitimate and, hence, is to be followed. 
In this type of authority, the relationship between the ruler and the ruled does not 
have to be institutionalized.
Legal authority rests on regulations created by law and is exercised only in accor-
dance with them. Everyone is supposed to follow the regulations, including those 
who hold power. Here, the relationship is institutionalized and impersonalized. The 
charismatic type rests on the assumed and accepted extraordinary qualities of the 
power holder:
… a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary 
men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities. These are ... not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of 
divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a 
leader (Weber, 1947, pp.358-59).
This relationship can be institutionalized, but does not necessarily have to be. The 
three types are mixed in real life. The combination of the traditional and charismatic 
types is usually a feature of pre-modern societies. A mixture of traditional and legal 
types is a characteristic of modernity. The transition from pre-modernity to modernity 
is tantamount to changing the prevailing type of authority in society. The change may 
bring structural alterations, and it usually does. But the transition always changes 
societal values. For instance, moving from feudalism to capitalism brought about 
entrepreneurship and societal individuation, for such is the Geist des Kapitalismus 
(Weber, 1947, pp.91-92; 2003, pp.47-78).
The Geist of the Rechtsstaat, despite its formal “mechanics” of modernity, was 
not a factor that would bring about the change of the prevailing type of authority. This 
was quite ironic, for Kant with his ideal of negative freedom is usually thought of to 
be the one who inspired the very notion of the Rechtsstaat (Strauss and Cropsey, 1987, 
pp.581-82). Thus, the state, to be lawful, that is, legitimate, must be a union of people 
governed by reason protecting freedom and individualism. The state is not to inhibit 
the people’s freedom, for it is the gist of limited government. This, no doubt, was an 
importation of the rule of law. However, because it came from outside, it was quite 
strange and not necessarily appreciated by the Germans at large. Not surprisingly, the 
Kantian importation was relatively quickly tailored to the German tradition.
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The term Rechtsstaat was coined in 1798 by Johan Wilhelm Placidus and popular-
ized by Robert von Mohl in 1844 (Silkenat et al. 2014, p.296). However, while popu-
larizing it, von Mohl moved from negative freedom to positive freedom. Instead of 
protecting freedom and individual rights, the state became the giver of them. Since 
the state was to be law-based, or Rechtsstaat, it retained to a degree its Kantian idea. 
Consequently, it was still suitable for the tasks assigned to the state by Kant. It was 
just a change of how the state was to do it, not what it was to do and why.
However, the change of the how meant that Kant did not succeed, but von Mohl 
did. The Germanization of the Anglo-Saxon rule of law, for the Americans had become 
a party to it by then, worked quite well. Since the Germans were only starting their 
acquaintance with the principles and practice of liberal democracy, it was not surpris-
ing that the Rechtsstaat became a modernized extension of feudal rule in the end.
To be sure, Germany was not an exception in Europe at the time. Russia, for 
example, was not much different. In fact, Russia is still not much different. The Duma 
of the beginning of the twentieth century was an attempt to introduce the rule of law 
to Russia. However, the introduction was not successful. Similarly to the Rechtsstaat, 
the Russian Pravovoe Gosudarstvo also became an extension of feudal rule. Unlike in 
Germany, Russia did not have a Kant of its own. Hence, the introduction of the rule 
was Russified right from the beginning. 
The Decembrist uprising of 1825 marks the intensification of the struggle for the constitution 
in Russia. Decembrist thinking, however, is highly ambivalent and contradictory, with the Sou-
thern Society represented by Pavel Pestel favouring a strong but republican state to achieve the 
aim of modernisation, while the Northern Society’s views on constitutionalism were more liberal 
and federalist while at the same time monarchist (Sakwa, 1996, p.115).
Thus, the choice was between a republic with a strong president endowed with 
powers similar to the absolutist rule of a king or a monarchy with a sovereign, perhaps 
gentle, yet still entirely in charge of the rights of the people who were to stay subjects 
rather than become citizens. This was not much of a choice, for both Societies were 
assuming that the state was the giver of rights rather than a protector of them. This 
put the Decembrists in direct opposition to the rule of law, even though they were 
demanding constitutionalism in Russia. The prevailing type of authority was not to 
be changed. The ruler, be it president or king, was to remain extraordinarily power-
ful, perhaps because only an extraordinary person, a charismatic figure, could have 
so much power. Paradoxically or not, the demands for constitutionalism, however 
understood, was the revolutionary part of the Decembrists, for in Russia constitution-
alism was deemed to be incompatible with the country’s political culture (Walicki, 
1987, pp.15-16).
The incompatibility was reflected in the Dumas. Those who were instrumental 
for setting up the bodies did not care much about them. The first two Dumas lasted 
less than 200 days, despite being dominated by the Kadets, who were supposed to be 
liberal and western. The third and fourth Dumas lasted five years each, and, while 
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lasting, they engaged in passing thousands of bills, thus pursuing legalism similar 
to that of the Rechtsstaat (Jackson and Devlin, 1989). The difference was the fact 
that while the German parliament operated in a state that was becoming increas-
ingly stronger, the Russian Dumas were passing the many bills in a country that was 
becoming steadily ungovernable.
The relationship between the legalism of the Dumas and the weakening of the 
state was only confirming the notion that the ruler must be strong. Consequently, 
law in Russia could only work if it was one of the tools of the ruler. If law was used by 
something or somebody else other than the power holder, it was pretty much useless, 
which is why it did not stop the decay of the czardom. This was the chief difference 
between the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, which was stressing the power of the ruler, and 
the Rechtsstaat, which emphasizedg the strength of the state.
Consequently, the Rechtsstaat had the potential of moving German society from 
one based on the charismatic-traditional type of authority to the traditional-legal type. 
Thus, when coupled with Rechtsstaatlichkeit, the original legalism of the Rechtsstaat 
could be transformed into a foundation of a rule-of-law regime that requires a more 
detailed form of governance, often referred to as judicialization of politics (Blair, 1978), 
to protect the freedom and rights of the citizens. Thus, the state, and this remains the 
case in contemporary Germany, still relies on regulation, but now it is used to protect 
the freedom and rights of the citizens, not to rule over the subjects.
However, the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, a term and concept that appeared in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century (Sakwa, 1996, p.116), had no such potential, for 
it still rested on the idea that power belonged to the Batushka, an extraordinary and 
paternalistic leader who holds it to protect and promote the well-being of Russia. Any 
institutionalization of power, such as the Dumas, went against the grain of Russia, 
therefore. No wonder, then, that the next attempt at using law as an instrument of 
modernization would only come in the late 1980s Soviet Union.
The constitutions in the Soviet Union had chiefly a propaganda role to play, just 
to show that the USSR was as democratic as any western state was. The exception of 
sorts was the 1918 constitution, for it, at least in theory, introduced federalism based 
on nationality. Had the federalism been indeed implemented, the Soviet Union would 
have been a very different state, most likely. But then again, the reason for the failure 
of Soviet federalism was the prevailing type of authority. Federalism requires sharing 
of power. This calls for a scheme of sharing that is institutionalized somehow, usually 
by the constitution. However, how can power be shared if the holder of it has, or 
is supposed to have, extraordinary qualities? Charisma, however based, cannot be 
shared.
The Pravovoe Gosudarstvo was included in the 1993 constitution of the Russian 
Federation. However, the term was revived during the Gorbachev period. At that time, 
rights of individuals and groups in relation to the state were looked at as something 
that was to be respected and weaknesses in the law were to be fixed. (Barry, 1992, 
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pp.xii-xiv). By the middle of the 1990s, the weaknesses should have been fixed, one 
could presume.
On the surface, the reforms seem impressive. An enormous number of laws have been drafted 
with the assistance of Western experts. Many have gone on to become law, either through the 
legislative process or via Presidential decree. … Given this [Soviet] legacy, merely passing new 
laws and revitalizing legal institutions is not sufficient. If these reforms are to be meaningful, 
they have to aspire to more; namely, to reshaping basic societal attitudes toward law. Absent 
attitudinal changes-that is changes in the underlying legal culture-even the best laws (from a 
technical point of view) will lie dormant (Hendley, 1996, pp.238-39).
Societal change can come either from above, which was the case in England or 
Germany, or from below, for example, France. Either way, there has to be a force 
determined to introduce reforms in a serious and profound way. So far, Russia has 
been lacking such a force. That is why the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo remains what 
the Rechtsstaat was before it was supplemented by Rechtsstaatlichkeit. In Russia, 
however, the pre-modern type of authority continues to prevail. And as long as it 
does, law will be a tool in the hands of the leader. Thus, the legal is to serve the ruler 
and the practical is to observe the law and, hence, serve the ruler. This is the nature 
of the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo. 
Steven Blank makes a good point:
Western failure to understand the crucial role that the absence of secure rights to property plays 
in the evolution of Russia and the failure to understand that without it and its historical deriva-
tions either a modern state with a genuine market economy or a state governed by law is incon-
ceivable have vitiated much Western analysis of Russia that insists on comparing it to states 
which have precisely this missing ingredient (Blank, 2008, p.234).
Indeed, the right to own property is one of the critical rights of a citizen. In Russia, 
this right has been absent so far. The tsars used to take away property from disobe-
dient aristocrats. Putin has done the same, for example, Yukos. Law is certainly an 
important element of the transition from pre-modernity to modernity, as long as it 
protects individuals from the arbitrary rule of a power holder. For law to play this role 
in continental Europe is a question of the balance between rights and goods. 
While analyzing the Rechtsstaat, Weber became strongly critical of the Sozialstaat. 
Weber’s SL [Sociology of Law] is first and foremost an intense confrontation with what was a 
transformation of state and society in Weber’s own time: specifically, the transition from the 
nineteenth-century liberal state, or Rechtsstaat, to the administrative/welfare state, or Sozial-
staat, of the twentieth century. (McCormick, 2007, p.2).
At the time, the Sozialstaat was a product of the complex set of the multitude of regu-
lations related to the distribution of public goods. As such, the Sozialstaat became 
indeed the vehicle for the movement away from the Kantian negative freedom towards 
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von Mohl’s positive freedom. Of course later, when the Rechtsstaat and Rechtssta-
atlichkeit will be moving the German state back to Kant’s vision of it, the Sozialstaat 
will move as well by being incorporated into the 1949 Grundgesetz. Until then, and 
certainly at the time when Weber was analyzing it, he had a good reason to associate 
the Sozialstaat with pre-modern paternalism. Going backward, however, is irrational, 
especially if law is used for this. After all, for him, modern western societies shared a 
legal order characterized by rationality (Kronman, 1983, p.73).
Thus, for Weber the Sozialstaat was a degeneration of the Rechtsstaat. The latter 
went the wrong way. Instead of fostering freedom and rights, it was strongly de-
emphasising both. And while doing so, it used law to institutionalize the personal-
ized rule of the chancellor by making the personalization impersonal or, perhaps, 
non-personal. In other words, the recreated modern feudal ruler was not the person 
who held the office of chancellor, but rather it was the chancellery itself, for it com-
manded both rights and goods to be dispersed through law but at the discretion of the 
office holder. 
By losing its original Kantian origin and therefore the idea to use reason to 
rationalize political rule, the Rechtsstaat was simply turning into a mere regulatory 
machine. 
In 1928, Hans Kelsen in his “Pure Theory of Law” (“Reine Rechtslehre”) radically 
affirmed the identity of the state and the law. The state was nothing but Rechtsstaat 
in a formal sense of the term (Koetter, 2013). 
The machine had no substance other than just producing regulations. In turn, 
regulations were just rules to follow by robots-like people. Reason was replaced by 
legalistic procedural mechanisms. The Sozialstaat was firming up the faceless, pater-
nalistic rule. Rights are normative, they need rationalization and they require citizens. 
A regulation on how to obtain, say, insurance payments, is just that – regulation.
Putin has been determined to set up the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo in that degener-
ated form. In fact, the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo was all along degenerated. However, to 
re-launch government in Russia, Putin had no choice. When he came to power, the 
Russian Federation was on the way to collapsing. The decade of Yeltsin’s presidency 
with its “wild, wild capitalism” was about to destroy whatever remnants of gover-
nance were carried over from the Soviet state.
That is where Putin came in. He was and is personally committed to reaffirming central state 
power vis-a-vis the “oligarchs,” the mass media, and the republics and regions. And what is scar-
cely less important than Putin’s determination to re-establish central state power is the fact that 
there are many in the federal administration-whether presidential or governmental-who have 
been waiting impatiently for such leadership. That a handful of rich businessmen should have 
exerted so much influence over public policy and the mass media is anathema to them, as is the 
idea that any republics or regions should be beyond central control. Putin, in other words, has an 
institutional base for reinventing the strong state. (Brown, 2001, p.47, italics original)
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Given the popular support for Putin coming from the Russians, they, too, were waiting 
for the strong leader and the strong government, for as Putin noticed, “… from the 
very beginning, Russia was created as a supercentralized state. That’s practically laid 
down in its genetic code, its traditions, and the mentality of its people” (quoted in 
Brown, 2001, p.51). Moreover, “[t]here [was] strong demand from within the federal 
center for a restoration of lost power. If Putin [could not] supply it, some of his current 
supporter [might] look for someone else who [would]” (Brown, 2001, p.51).
In the past, and not too distant, the ruler could simply apply terror, kill the oppo-
nents, real or imagined, and retain all the strings of power in his hands. Those times 
are gone now, especially after the Yeltsin decade. During the 1990s, Russia stopped 
being insulated from the outside world the way the Soviet Union was. This does not 
mean, however, that Russia has embarked on the road to liberal democracy. Instead, 
as it seems, the Russian Federation when it emerged from the USSR was more or less 
at the point Germany had been at the time of the unification: personal rule was longed 
for; the state was weak; governance was problematic; modernity was encroaching; no 
true reformers were present; and the legitimacy of the power holder was questionable.
Under the circumstance, when Putin came to power, his work was cut out for 
him. The Russian flirtation with western ideas and democracy in the 1990s became a 
miserable experience, similar to the Germans’ experience with the Weimar Republic. 
Thus going west was not an option; going straight back to the past was not an option 
either. Putin can be a lot of things to a lot of people, but Ivan the Terrible or Stalin he 
is not. The only viable choice was that supercentralized state; supercentralization, 
however, needed to be overhauled by being updated to accommodate the changes 
that occurred after the end of the USSR. 
Even though Russia had the pravovoe gosudarstvo as an idea since the nineteenth 
century, it was never really practiced. Instead, it was more of an ideal formed as a 
concoction of some western thoughts and practices mixed into Russia’s realties and 
tradition. However, now was the time to put the idea and ideal into practice. As Putin 
explained it,
A very important part of our common work is to strengthen the vertical structure of power. This 
presupposes control by the federal centre and effective feedback. I am confident that the State 
Council can be an excellent tool for such interaction (quoted in Brown, 2001, pp.50-51).
The Council is formally an advisory body to the president composed of regional 
leaders. When Yeltsin left office, the regional governors ran the federal units as if they 
were their personal fiefdoms. By gathering them in one place and under his control, 
Putin has neutralized their influence in the regions. This way the Council, which he 
controls, has greatly increased his power. And since the Council is institutionalized, 
regulation is the chief method of keeping tabs on the governors. Thus, by using law, 
Putin actually increased his power, which in Russia is not the usual way of doing it.
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Archie Brown points out Putin’s selective use of law as a way of strengthening 
his power (Brown, 2001, p.48). Blank highlights the role of law in the work of the 
FSB, as envisioned by Putin: “This [security] work must be done strictly in line with 
the law and all of your steps must be based on the Constitution and Russian laws” 
(Blank, 2008, p.247). This sounds like a “KGB by the book.” The security service, as 
the ruler’s direct instrument of power, can still be used whenever and wherever he 
deems it necessary. But this time, his control over the service and the service’s control 
over all others is to be done through law. The same is applicable to the tax-collecting 
service, for example.
The Federal Tax Service has also proposed expanding the range of sources that can or must 
submit information on the population’s incomes to the tax authorities. This would include orga-
nizations that pay cash prizes to individuals, information on all sales of movable property, and 
the sales of means of transport (Blank, 2008, p.248).
If the proposition is to make sense, the collection of the tax information and taxes 
requires a structure and regulation. Given the nature of the information to be col-
lected, the regulation has to be precise and detailed. Consequently, the legalism of 
the Rechtsstaat is replicated in the Putin version of the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo. Law, 
that is, regulation, reflects the changed supercentralization scheme instigated by the 
fleeting arrival of the west in Russia in the 1990s. Blank quotes a Russian analyst’s 
take on Putin’s use of regulation:
To retain his influence in the country, according to available data, he is putting the real prere-
quisites into operation: In the first place, he is de-facto putting the power structures under his 
jurisdiction, in the second place, the government and the Duma will be in his hands, in the third 
place, control over the mass information media will be switched to the government machinery, 
and in the fourth place, the role of the president’s staff will be reduced (as in the United States) to 
the technical servicing of the work of the new president (quoted in Blank, 2008, p.250).
This looks like the regulatory machinery of the Rechtsstaat.
He also refers to the idea of “regular government” that some tsarist reforms in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries tried to put in place in order to improve gov-
ernance. (Blank, 2008, p.250). If this idea indeed guides Putin, it cannot be a mere 
replication of it. 
The “regular government” was about centralized, flawless operation and, thus, 
perfect organization. In reality, the tsarist government was anything but flawless and 
perfect. It relied on force, ad hoc actions and improvisation. The tsars did not depend 
on law, even if they wanted to, precisely because of the malady of their rule, which 
certainly was the case in the nineteenth century. The tsarist bureaucracy was indo-
lent, corrupt and fragmented. Therefore, to set it up successfully, the “regular govern-
ment,” needs to be significantly “irregular.” What will stay regular is the status of 
the people, who are to remain subjects, and freedom and rights will continue to be in 
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the domain of the state. The irregular is to be the amplified efficiency of governance 
achieved through the use of law in the form of the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo readjusted 
through the inclusion of the Rechtsstaat.
Mr. Putin would take up this mission in earnest as president. Within months of taking over the 
presidency in January 2000, Mr. Putin worked to rebuild state power by constructing a “rule-by-
law state” where law formulated by the presidential administration would be implemented in 
the country by courts and prosecutors. This Putinist legal system relied heavily on the “strategic-
operational dichotomy” that Mr. Putin had outlined in his plagiarized thesis. The president for-
mulated strategic policy through lawmaking, and judges and prosecutors monitored the imple-
mentation of these laws though the judicial process. To implement this legal power vertically, 
Mr. Putin focused his attention on coordinating legislative policy with parliament by simplifying 
legal codes and signaling to judges and prosecutors that he would expand their power in return 
for loyalty (Partlett, 2012).
His rule-by-law state is to have an orderly structure for using law as a critically impor-
tant and positively efficient tool of modern governance utilized for an updated, that is 
institutionalized personalized rule of Russia’s leader. 
Using law to improve governance was also Gorbachev’s idea. 
[d]uring the last years of its life the Soviet Union turned to law like a dying monarch to his withe-
red God ...and the Congress and Supreme Soviet enact[ed] and amend[ed] statutes with the 
fervour of one who sees in legislation the path to paradise (Rudden, 1994, p.56).
Gorbachev desperately tried to save his power and the Soviet Union. Legislation was 
one of the ways to do so. However, he did not have a workable plan for reform and a 
way of executing it. Even worse, Perestroika and Glasnost carried the tint of western-
ization, which meant that they were to be planted into a milieu that was not fertile. 
This rendered them artificial. Moreover, he did not control the state apparatus. The 
bureaucrats by and large were in opposition to him. As a result, it could be bills or 
beats, for his reforms were Hail Marys thrown into the wind of disintegration and 
chaos. This is not the case with Putin. 
No doubt, Putin’s plan to strengthen Russia is systematic. It includes a vision 
of what a reformed Russia is to be like. It is to be efficient, governable, wealthy and 
influential. Also, it is to be regulation-based. But it is not to be western. Instead, it is to 
have some western elements squared with the Russian tradition.. It is to be a sovereign 
democracy, “…a concept linking selected western democratic attributes with a nativ-
ist Russia-centric vision” (Ruth, 2012, p.230; see also, Remington, 2007; Monaghan, 
2008; Stent, 2008), which is often promoted as “… a kind of new national ideol-
ogy” (Averre, 2007, p.174) or managed democracy “… [which] will have all the formal 
institutions of democracy: elections, parties, media, civil society, and so on. But the 
real autonomy of these institutions and, therefore, their real capacity to influence 
the actions of the state will be severely limited.” (Lipman and McFaul, 2001, p.116). 
The former is personalized rule by regulation, the latter is supposed to be Russia’s 
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contribution to the different forms of democracy, quite likely a Russian version of 
German democracy. 
Because of his KGB years, Putin is intimately familiar with Germany, the language 
and the ways the state and society work. If regulation works in Germany, it can work 
in Russia. If Germany is a democracy framed by the wide-ranging and all-embracing 
legislative system, Russia, too, can be democratic with its own equally comprehen-
sive regulation. Since Germany is rich, Russia can be rich as well. Germany is not a 
carbon copy of the Anglo-Saxon rule of law. Russia can also have its own version of it. 
Germany works well. Russia will work well, by the same token.
For Putin, there can only be one conclusion here: the Rechtsstaat is to be incor-
porated into the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo; but the incorporation must be on Russia’s 
terms. When this is accomplished, Russia will have the old ideal of the “regular gov-
ernment” in reality. The tsars did not do it. The general secretaries did not it. Putin, at 
least according to Putin, can do it. If so, he will be the saviour of Russia now and later. 
When he is gone, the Russian version of the rule of law will stay in place. There were 
Catherine the Great and Peter the Great, both imported western elements to Russia 
and this worked, but only for a while. Well, neither of them included law into their 
importations and used it to make their reforms successful. Now is Putin’s turn. Since 
he is employing the Russian version of the rule of law, the reforms will last, just like 
in Germany. Or will they?
The Rechtsstaat was from the beginning accompanied the Sozialstaat, which was 
constantly growing. In 1911 the Reich insurance system was extended to civil servants 
and, generally, white-collar workers. The unemployment insurance was introduced 
in 1927. More and more public goods were distributed to more and more segments of 
society. And as long as the Sozialstaat worked well, the Rechtsstaat could continue 
the trade-off: goods but not freedom and rights. When the state could not deliver the 
goods during the Weimar Republic, the governance was immediately weakened.
What about the Russian Sozialstaat? Where are the goods? They have never been 
aplenty in Russia. The USSR had problems with their quantity, quality and delivery; 
but then, the Soviet people did not pay taxes. Now, the Russians do. To be able to 
deliver the goods and maintain the original trade-off of the Rechtsstaat, Putin has 
to have the means, that is, functioning economy. Since Yeltsin linked it to the global 
economy, Russia’s economy has become driven by the markets. Of course, it can still 
be regulated, but it cannot be controlled the way the tsars or general secretaries could 
and did, or Bismarck.
When Bismarck was setting the Rechtsstaat, his government, like most other 
governments at the time, was involved in the economy in a direct way. That was 
then, however; now, in a globalizing world, state intervention has been substan-
tially reduced, for the role of the state has profoundly changed in recent decades 
(Lake, 2010; Goodhart and Taninchev, 2011). And so has the utility, quantity and 
quality of state regulation. Even worse, market economy needs independent courts 
that can adjudicate contractual disputes, for example, without the unduly political 
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interference. Putin, however, wants loyal judges, not independent ones. Independent 
courts would require sharing of power. However, sharing of power has been so far 
incompatible with Russia’s rulers. 
The absence of a functioning Sozialstaat in Putin’s Russia is certainly a problem 
if his Pravovoe Gosudarstvo is to succeed. But can he solve the problem if he puts in 
place the Sozialstaat, efficient as it could possibly be, no matter how difficult this 
task would be? Jürgen Habermas summarized Weber’s critical view of the Bismarck-
ian Sozialstaat in the following way: 
Paradigms harden into ideologies insofar as they systematically close themselves off from the 
perception of radically new situations and resist different interpretations of rights and princip-
les, interpretations that press for acknowledgment in the light of radically new historical experi-
ences [,] . . . [which] stabilize themselves through professionally and judicially institutionalized 
monopolies on interpretation and permit only internal revision according to their own standards 
(Habermas, 1996, p.221).
Because the Sozialstaat that Weber dealt with lost rational-formal law, it could not 
adopt itself to radically new situations, that is, societal change. 
By the time Habermas analyzed the Sozialstaat, it had regained its rationality, 
which is why it now strengthens constitutional democracy. It is so, for
… [l]aw is … both institutionally administrative and socially participatory because it translates 
popular will into government action. It is generated by public communication but also reaches 
back into society to foster the conditions of further communication. (McCormick, 2007, p.216)
Whether Weber or Habermas, Putin’s Pravovoe Gosudarstvo appears to be doomed. 
If it is Weber, degeneration of any kind by definition cannot succeed. The 
Rechtsstaat without Rechtsstaatlichkeit is out of date and out of purpose, therefore. 
A creation from the nineteenth century cannot work in the twenty first century. The 
kind of society that existed then does not exist today.
If it is Habermas, then Putin is playing with fire. The non-degenerated form of 
the Sozialstaat will create solidarity leading to the formation of community whose 
members will demand rights, for they will act rationally. To put it crudely: instead of 
choosing to be fed rather than have rights, the Russians will sooner or later choose 
both.
Law is an important factor of societal change, but only if it is in the form of rule of 
law. And if it is, the state becomes the representation of the political will of the people. 
This is not the case with the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, for it instills collectivism by regu-
lation. The state is the representation of the will of the power holder. And rights can 
only by afforded by the state. Law is also essential for community formation: to live 
together, we need rules. To live by them, the rules ought to be a result of a deliberative 
process, for law is a practice, “… an assemblage of rules, principles, canons, maxims, 
customs, usages, and manners that condition and sustain the activity of governing” 
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(Loughlin, 2003, p.30). As such, law is public because it is formed on the basis of 
public will; it changes along with society, for it is the sum of its will. In the Pravovoe 
Gosudarstvo community is not formed; it is imposed. Law is private, for it is formed 
by the power holder. It changes when the power holder decides to change it, for it is 
the sum of his will.
The Rechtsstaat has been a prominent part of the development of law, legal 
systems, practice, and culture in Europe. It has significantly contributed to the devel-
opment of codified law. At first, it facilitated the introduction of regulation as a step 
in the process of moving away from feudalism. Later, with the Rechtsstaatlichkeit, 
it became a way of incorporating the rule of law, thus turning into a path to liberal 
democracy. As a result, the Rechtsstaat has markedly modified the substance of the 
legal and the utility of the practical. The legal has changed from what the ruler has 
passed to what the state as the representative of the popular will has legislated. The 
practical has moved from serving the ruler to becoming the practical expression of 
representation through which “… conflict [can] be positively harnessed, appropriate 
governing arrangements devised, and real political will established” (Loughlin, 2003, 
p.64).
Walter Bagehot, while commenting on the British Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867, 
observed:
A new Constitution does not produce its full effect as long as all its subjects were reared under 
an old Constitution, as long as its statesmen were trained by that old Constitution. It is not really 
tested till it comes to be worked by statesmen and among a people neither of whom are guided 
by a different experience (Bagehot, 1873).
Given the central position of Germany in Europe, the country’s political influence 
and intellectual prominence, the Rechtsstaat played a prominent role in the rearing 
of both the rulers and the ruled. At first, it transformed personal, direct rule of the 
feudal landlords into institutionalized, personal rule of post-feudal rulers, and con-
verted peasants into subjects. With the addition of Rechtsstaatlichkeit, the rulers have 
become elected officials and the subjects have become citizens. In the end, by now 
almost all of Europe’s states and societies moved from “We the Ruler” to “We the 
People”.
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